Frames and Consensus Formation in International Relations: The Case of Trafficking in Persons by Charnysh, Volha et al.
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository 
Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law 
2015 
Frames and Consensus Formation in International Relations: The 




U.S. Department of State 
Beth A. Simmons 
University of Pennsylvania Carey Law School 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship 
 Part of the Criminal Law Commons, Human Rights Law Commons, International Law Commons, 
International Relations Commons, Law and Politics Commons, Public Law and Legal Theory Commons, 
and the Social Psychology Commons 
Repository Citation 
Charnysh, Volha; Lloyd, Paulette; and Simmons, Beth A., "Frames and Consensus Formation in 
International Relations: The Case of Trafficking in Persons" (2015). Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law. 
1685. 
https://scholarship.law.upenn.edu/faculty_scholarship/1685 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository. It has been 
accepted for inclusion in Faculty Scholarship at Penn Law by an authorized administrator of Penn Law: Legal 
Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact PennlawIR@law.upenn.edu. 
European Journal of 
International Relations
2015, Vol. 21(2) 323 –351
© The Author(s) 2014





Frames and consensus 
formation in international 









This article examines the process of consensus formation by the international community 
regarding how to confront the problem of trafficking in persons. We analyze the corpus 
of United Nations General Assembly Third Committee resolutions to show that: (1) 
consensus around the issue of how to confront trafficking in persons has increased over 
time; and (2) the formation of this consensus depends upon how the issue is framed. 
We test our argument by examining the characteristics of resolutions’ sponsors and 
discursive framing concepts such as crime, human rights, and the strength of enforcement 
language. We conclude that the consensus-formation process in international relations 
is more aptly described as one of ‘accommodation’ through issue linkage than a process 
of persuasion.
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Introduction
The past three decades have seen two interesting global trends: renewed attention to 
human rights and an increased effort to combat transnational crime. Trafficking in per-
sons raises issues precisely at the intersection of these two trends. It involves both seri-
ous violations of the rights of persons being trafficked — the right to security of the 
person, the right to be paid and to work under decent conditions, even potentially the 
right to life — as well as the commission of serious transnational crimes, from kidnap-
ping, to money laundering, to fraud. Despite the complexity of the issue, there has been 
a fairly swift convergence among states and other actors that trafficking in persons is a 
serious problem that should be addressed both in international law and domestic criminal 
statutes.
How do we explain the recent rapid agreement by many countries to criminalize the 
exploitative trans-shipment of people across borders? Our central hypothesis is that issue 
framing has been critical in the process of consensus formation. We examine evidence of 
issue framing and normative convergence in the one forum in which every state on earth 
has a right to participate, and on which non-governmental actors also have some influ-
ence: the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA). Successive UNGA resolutions 
expose the process of consensus formation that makes binding agreements possible and 
sustainable.1 We use resolutions of the UNGA Social, Humanitarian and Cultural Affairs 
Committee (the ‘Third Committee’) to show that: (1) consensus on the best approach to 
confront trafficking in persons has increased over time; and (2) the development of this 
consensus has depended upon how the issue was framed, with a ‘crime-fighting’ frame 
generating more support than a ‘human rights’ frame, especially in the crucial period 
leading up to the adoption of the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish Trafficking in 
Persons (TIP Protocol) in 2000.2
The argument is tested by literally watching consensus grow over time in the lan-
guage of 12 resolutions on trafficking in women and girls adopted by the Third Committee 
between 1994 and 2012.3 Since there is no voting record on these resolutions, the formal 
record of which countries co-sponsored and endorsed each resolution is used to trace 
how the changes in content correlate with patterns of endorsement over time. We first 
analyze the evolution of these 12 resolutions and then estimate logistic models of support 
patterns for 150 countries for a total of 1800 country-year observations. We find that 
framing trafficking in persons as a common threat (linked to transnational crime) encour-
aged more states to support stronger resolutions than framing the issue in terms of com-
mon responsibilities (to protect/respect human rights). This suggests that the 
consensus-formation process is more aptly described as one of accommodation of differ-
ing values rather than a process of persuasion toward a single normative approach. Even 
in an area as imbued with normative significance as the trafficking of human beings, 
consensus is not necessarily achieved by changing minds or values, but by accommodat-
ing the values of a broad range of states.
Our findings contribute to a significant strand of research that explores the extent to 
which issue framing contributes to policy formation (Bleich, 2002). While our conclu-
sion will hardly surprise those who view ‘securitization’ as a powerful driving force in 
world politics (Buzan et al., 1998), it is a useful reminder that international consensus 
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may have more to do with how issues are framed rather than persuading others to do the 
right thing. The analysis may help shed light on the development of international consen-
sus on other policy issues, from migration and human smuggling, to food security and 
HIV/AIDS.
The article begins with a description of trafficking in persons and the context of rapid 
globalization in which it has been discussed over the past two decades. The next section 
theorizes consensus formation, and develops a model of how consensus is achieved inter-
nationally. This section focuses on issue framing, which is especially critical under condi-
tions of uncertainty and fluidity, such as those facing states in the early post-Cold War 
period. The third section presents evidence from UNGA resolutions that consensus on a 
new framework to confront trafficking in persons developed rather quickly, and that this 
can largely be attributed to framing the issue in terms of its links to transnational crime. 
Evidence at both the level of the resolution and at the level of each state’s decision to sup-
port a resolution suggests that while human rights concerns are important, crime frames 
have elicited more and stronger support from states. The final section concludes with the 
implications for reaching consensus on complex and contentious international problems.
The international response to trafficking in persons
Trafficking in persons is a multidimensional issue involving most countries of the world 
to some degree. The United Nations (UN) claims that it is the third most profitable sector 
of organized crime, after drug smuggling and illicit arms transfers.4 While internal traf-
ficking is also very common, victims trafficked from over 136 countries were found in 
118 countries worldwide between 2007 and 2010 alone.5 The extent of the problem has 
only compounded the potential diversity of approaches to confront it.
Trafficking in persons is hardly a recent phenomenon. States have tried to cooperate 
on this issue for over a century. A series of early international agreements, including the 
International Agreement for the Suppression of White Slave Trade (1904)6 and the 
Convention for the Suppression of the Traffic in Women and Children (1921),7 were 
primarily aimed at coordinating efforts among states to enforce national anti-prostitution 
laws. The former called for the notification of authorities of ‘persons in charge of women 
and girls destined for an immoral life.’8 It did not, however, mandate much positive 
action to insure their protection from broader harm. The 1921 agreement has similar 
purposes (and explicitly refers to the earlier agreement), though it drops the racist lan-
guage and apparently broadens its focus beyond prostitution, calling for some regulatory 
oversight of employment agencies ‘to ensure the protection of women and children seek-
ing employment in another country.’9
The Second World War brought these codification efforts to a standstill, but in 1949, 
the UN passed a resolution that entered into force in 1951 as the Convention on the 
Suppression of Trafficking in Persons and the Exploitation of the Prostitution of Others.10 
Without the overt racism of the early 20th century, this agreement again posed prostitu-
tion of women and children as the central problem. Transnational trafficking — moving 
persons via criminal networks from one place to another — was secondary. Despite the 
massive displacement of the war years, international support was tepid: a decade after 
opening for signature and ratification, it had garnered only 25 state parties.
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Nearly half a century would pass before the international community made another 
serious effort to tackle trafficking in persons, this time reaching a sweeping agreement in 
only a few years’ time. The TIP Protocol (2000) defines trafficking in persons as:
the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of persons, by means of the threat 
or use of force or other forms of coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the abuse of 
power or of a position of vulnerability or of the giving or receiving of payments or benefits to 
achieve the consent of a person having control over another person, for the purpose of 
exploitation.11
Furthermore, it views ‘the recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring or receipt of a 
child for the purpose of exploitation’ as trafficking in persons, regardless of the means 
used.12 It obligates state parties to criminalize trafficking in persons in their national 
statutes,13 and to protect victims’ privacy and identity ‘in appropriate cases and to the 
extent possible under domestic law.’14 As of June 2013, more than 150 states have rati-
fied the TIP Protocol and 140 countries have criminalized sex and labor trafficking in 
their national law.15
Something had clearly changed by the 1990s — but what? One answer lies in the 
normative development in the field of human rights. From the 1970s to the 1990s, inter-
national legal instruments guaranteeing human rights — both ‘hard’ and ‘soft’ law — 
burgeoned in a range of areas, from torture prohibition, to women’s rights, to the rights 
of children (Simmons, 2009). Rights advocacy groups bloomed and influenced norms, 
law, and practice worldwide (Clark, 2001; Korey, 1998). Rights claims have been cred-
ited with creating difficult-to-resist spirals (Risse et al., 1999) and boomerangs (Keck 
and Sikkink, 1998), which eventually contributed to holding governments more account-
able for human rights violations than had ever been the case in the past. Indeed, some 
scholars have written about the latter decades of the 20th century in terms of a veritable 
‘rights revolution’ (Epp, 1998).
Another critical contextual change has been the economic liberalization and, for 
many, dislocation associated with the end of the Cold War and, indeed, globalization 
writ large (Bhattacharyya, 2005). The breakdown of the Soviet Union opened borders 
to the flow of people and goods, both legal and illicit, at unprecedented rates. New 
crime routes evolved and fueled networks involving trafficking in drugs, people, and 
weapons, and associated crimes like money laundering, corruption, and possibly even 
terrorist financing (Thachuk, 2007). Transnational crime — estimated at USD730 bil-
lion a year worldwide16 — was increasingly viewed as a threat to legitimate local 
economies, with the potential to undermine law and order. Developing and transition-
ing states were particularly vulnerable to this wave as they often lacked the capacity to 
police, prosecute, or secure borders against large criminal networks (Lloyd et al., 
2012).
The global organizational response to trafficking in persons reflects these two con-
texts. As early as 1985, the Seventh United Nations Congress on the Prevention of Crime 
(which meets every five years) began to focus discussions on the global threat presented 
by organized crime. By the Eighth Congress in 1990, both newly independent and estab-
lished states were demanding new international institutions to confront it. The first step 
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in this direction was the establishment of a Commission on Crime Prevention, followed 
by a World Ministerial Conference on Organized Transnational Crime, convened in 
1994. This conference attracted an unprecedented number of attendees — 142 state del-
egations (86 at the ministerial level) — in addition to intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations. The conference agreed to establish a group of experts with 
the mandate to draft an international instrument on transnational crime. Operating out of 
the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) in Vienna, this group held 11 
sessions over a two-year period, from which the draft of the first-ever ‘international 
crime bill,’ the United Nations Convention against Transnational Organized Crime 
(UNCTOC), emerged.17
Parallel to these discussions (referred to as the Vienna Process), a series of debates on 
trafficking in persons took place in a number of UN bodies, but particularly in the Third 
Committee of the UNGA. Between 1994 and 2012, the Third Committee debated and 
adopted a series of 12 resolutions focused on Trafficking in Women and Girls (1994–
2012) and four resolutions on the coordination of efforts against trafficking in persons 
(2006–2012).
These developments reflect an extraordinarily broad and speedy (by diplomatic stand-
ards) move toward a legally binding response to human trafficking. In about five years, 
the international community moved from 45 years of silence to a binding treaty obligat-
ing states to prevent human trafficking, to protect its victims, and, most especially, to 
criminalize trafficking and prosecute traffickers. The consensus is fragile, yet, as of this 
writing, has been maintained. This raises a question central to world politics: how has 
this consensus been possible, given the sensitive and complicated nature of the problem 
of trafficking in persons? The answer will provide insights into how consensus among 
heterogeneously situated actors develops at the international level.
A theory of consensus formation: The importance of 
framing
Issue framing and normative consensus formation
We hypothesize that issue framing has had a great deal to do with consensus making on 
trafficking in persons — and potentially many other international issues as well. Framing 
can be understood broadly as ‘a way of selecting, organizing, interpreting, and making 
sense of a complex reality to provide guideposts for knowing, analyzing, persuading, and 
acting’ (Rein and Schön, 1993: 146). Whether employed consciously or not, frames 
allow individuals to filter information to make some of its aspects more salient than 
others.
A growing literature addresses the role that issue framing plays in social and political 
processes, at all levels of human interaction. Political psychologists have long recog-
nized that individuals’ attitudes are quite susceptible to issue framing (Tversky and 
Kahneman, 1981). Framing experiments demonstrate that the ‘lens’ through which a 
respondent views a question torques his or her attitudes on a broad range of questions 
(Chong and Druckman, 2007). Framing effects are said to occur when ‘[in] describing an 
issue or event, a speaker’s emphasis on a subset of potentially relevant considerations 
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causes individuals to focus on these considerations when constructing their opinions’ 
(Druckman, 2001: 1042). Frames have the potential to change the way individuals delib-
erate and what they believe to be important (Nelson and Oxley, 1999). They are espe-
cially influential when promulgated by sources the individual views as credible 
(Druckman, 2001) and when they are taken up by the modern media (Iyengar and Kinder, 
1987; Scheufele, 1999).
Framing has also been a prominent concept in sociology. Sociologists have docu-
mented the role of framing, especially during times of change as actors struggle to come 
to terms with how the world ‘works.’ Actors draw on framing to create a shared under-
standing of events that both legitimate and motivate action (Gamson and Modigliani, 
1989; McAdam et al., 1996). Since issue frames can be critical to the success or failure 
of social movements, they are sometimes deployed strategically by groups vying to 
organize supporters and to motivate action by challenging existing frames and replacing 
them with galvanizing ways to view the world (Benford and Snow, 2000). Snow and 
Benford (1988) identified ‘frame alignment’ — frames that are linked in congruency and 
complementariness — as an important element in social mobilization, and argue that 
social change is more likely when multiple frames resonate widely to inform and moti-
vate behavior. The incorporation of both prosecution and victim protection into the ‘3P’ 
(protection, prosecution, and prevention) framework of the TIP Protocol, for example, 
can be interpreted as a result of bringing together the highly salient frames of social 
threat and human rights.
Issue framing is also important in understanding relations between states. Security 
and foreign policy research is rife with studies of the ways in which adversaries are 
framed so as to rouse domestic audiences to support aggressive policy positions (Mintz 
and Redd, 2003). At a deeper level, constructivist theorists stress that interpretation is an 
essential aspect of the construction of reality, and therefore focus much of their analytic 
attention on how this reality is socially constructed (Adler, 2002). The securitization lit-
erature is consistent with these themes, but stresses ‘the process through which an issue 
is presented as an existential threat’ as a way to motivate extraordinary behavior (Buzan 
et al., 1998: 24). Although the securitization literature in International Relations (IR) and 
framing literatures in psychology and sociology have developed largely in isolation from 
one another, these approaches all perceive actors as (often strategically) constructing 
problems through discursive practices, and emphasize the role of ‘audience, communica-
tor and culture’ in the discursive process (Watson, 2012: 284).
Overall, literature from several disciplines fairly conclusively supports the idea that 
framing influences individuals’ attitudes and possibly even their political and social 
behavior. While frames have been criticized as shallow efforts to market policies and 
political ideas (Oliver and Johnston, 2000), they are also powerful tools for shaping the 
process of consensus building. If the framing of issues can have a significant impact on 
people’s attitudes, their political behavior, and their policy preferences, there are ample 
reasons to believe that framing can have a strong effect on the formation of policy con-
sensus. How an issue is framed, represented, and discussed can have a powerful effect on 
the likelihood of reaching agreement among actors who may have very different initial 
preferences and perspectives.
 at Harvard Libraries on June 24, 2015ejt.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
Charnysh et al. 329
Framing trafficking in persons: Human rights and transnational crime
Several frames are possible contenders for interpreting the problem of trafficking in 
persons (Pajnik, 2010), and a range of frames have gained in salience over time (see 
Locher, 2007). Historically, the highly gendered victim protection frame linked traffick-
ing to prostitution, as illustrated by international treaties of the first half of the 20th 
century. Championed by religious and women’s advocacy groups and some states, this 
frame views trafficking in persons as a matter of protecting the vulnerable from exploita-
tion, typically of a sexual nature, and (compared to the human rights frame, discussed 
next) de-emphasizes (though does not deny) the autonomy and rights-bearing nature of 
the trafficked individual.18
This frame predominated through at least the 1950s, but is visible today in the TIP 
Protocol, which gives considerable attention to victim protection.19 Nonetheless, by the 
late 1990s, the victim protection frame was weakened somewhat by divisions over the 
acceptability of ‘sex work’ — as reflected in debates over whether prostitution is an 
individual choice of profession (Doezema, 1999; Farrell and Fahy, 2009) or an inherently 
abusive activity from which individuals should be protected. These divisions were most 
clearly demarcated between conservative and liberal non-governmental organizations 
(NGOs) (Kempadoo and Doezema, 1998; Scarpa, 2008), but also characterized differ-
ences among states, as the Netherlands legalized and Sweden criminalized prostitution 
(Di Nicola, 2009). The frame was also weakened by the lack of distinction in some cases 
between trafficking victims deserving of protection and illicit immigration. Support for 
trafficking victims was lessened to the extent that they could themselves be cast as law-
breakers deserving of immediate repatriation.
Debates in the 1990s reflected the growing salience of another frame: the human 
rights frame. Along with globalization, the rights revolution in international and national 
law from the 1960s provided a compelling new way to think of trafficking in persons. 
Through the lens of human rights, trafficked persons are not simply ‘vulnerables’ to be 
protected; they are individuals with agency that need to be respected. While rights fram-
ing continues to view women and children as especially vulnerable, it moves beyond the 
focus on prostitution and gender to draw attention to the full spectrum of human rights 
violations that trafficking in persons involves: from labor violations, to violations of 
freedom of movement, to inhumane treatment, to (in the extreme) the right to life itself. 
The human rights frame emphasizes the coercive aspects of trafficking in persons and 
even the slave-like conditions in which a good many trafficked individuals are held.
The language of human rights was, and continues to be, a highly salient way to think 
about the problem of trafficking in persons. The Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women is an exemplary voice for the human rights frame. Building on the dense inter-
national legal structure of the past 40 years, in 1997, the Special Rapporteur criticized the 
narrow definition of trafficking found in the 1949–1951 agreement, referring to its 
understanding of trafficking in persons as ‘ill-defined’ and ‘uniquely abolitionist.’20 She 
chose to describe the plight of persons trafficked in terms redolent of human rights 
abuses that had gleaned widespread support internationally, including slavery and tor-
ture. Referring to the practice in terms of ‘modern-day slavery’ (Bales, 2005; Bales and 
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Soodalter, 2009) is an especially graphic way to emphasize that trafficking in persons is 
a serious violation of human rights.
The human rights frame understands trafficked persons as bearing rights to work and 
migrate without loss of dignity.21 In common with the victim protection frame, the human 
rights frame focuses on the plight of the individual and obligates states. It holds state 
officials responsible for preventing coercive bondage, but also for fully respecting the 
rights of individuals in every aspect of prevention and law enforcement, drawing heavily 
on international human rights law.
Non-state actors have been among the most determined to frame trafficking in per-
sons as a human rights abuse. In addition to the Special Rapporteur, the human rights 
frame has been articulated by several non-state actors, including Amnesty International,22 
the Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR), and international 
agencies including The United Nations Children’s Fund (UNICEF) and the International 
Organization for Migration (IOM) (Gallagher, 2001). These organizations have urged 
states to see the problem from a rights perspective, calling on them — with limited suc-
cess — to assure the protection of the rights of trafficked persons to remain in the desti-
nation country rather than forcibly returning them to their country of origin (Gallagher, 
2001). However, as the Special Rapporteur herself has noted, states have few incentives 
to genuinely embrace protection or rights frames, as source countries have economic 
incentives to encourage remittances and destination countries often find it easiest to sim-
ply repatriate foreign individuals who have been exploited on their soil.23
The (often gendered) victim protection frame, like the human rights frame more gen-
erally, focuses on the trafficked individual, and we therefore include both of these as 
elements of a human rights frame in our empirical work. In contrast, a third frame — the 
transnational organized crime frame — emphasizes traffickers as a challenge to state 
authority and societal well-being. This frame situates trafficking in persons firmly within 
the broader problem of criminal networks that transcend national borders, linking it to 
globalization, illicit labor migration (Hughes, 2000; Salt, 2000), and money laundering 
or migrant smuggling networks.
The crime frame views trafficking as corrosive of state authority, and even sees it as a 
potential national security threat (Farrell and Fahy, 2009; Thachuk, 2007; Vlassis, 2000). 
Early treaties tapped this frame, but only lightly, referring to victim ‘protection against 
the criminal traffic known as the “White Slave Traffic”’ (1904).24 Later agreements refer 
to the ‘offence’ (1921) of trafficking for purposes of prostitution and call for ‘punish-
ment’ (1949), without linking this offense to broader transnational threats. Emphasis 
clearly changed in the 1990s, even at the highest policy level. Former US President Bill 
Clinton first raised the concept of transnational organized crime as a global security 
threat in 1995 (Van Dijk, 2011) and the major European countries endorsed his analysis 
at a Group of 8 (G8) meeting in Lyon shortly thereafter. More than a decade later, Deputy 
National Security Adviser Denis McDonough noted that trafficking in persons ‘funda-
mentally endangers [the] international security’ of the US, by fueling transnational crime 
and potentially financing terrorist activities.25 The US media has increasingly framed 
trafficking in persons as a matter for crime-fighting, law enforcement, and prosecution, 
with mixed consequences (Farrell and Fahy, 2009). There is evidence that the global 
media follows the same trend, as Figure 1 demonstrates.
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The transnational crime frame resonates in Eurasia as well. From Europe to Asia, the 
fear of unwanted migration has raised concerns generally about migrants and asylum 
seekers as challenges to state sovereignty and potential criminal elements (Curley and 
Wong, 2008; Huysmans, 2000; Ibrahim, 2005), which, in turn, has led to enhanced polic-
ing capacities against ‘the other’ throughout Western Europe (Loader, 2002). Links 
between crime and migration have played into fears in countries of origin as well. Some 
campaigns to discourage unwanted migration from Eastern Europe, for example, have 
purposefully sought to associate it with trafficking in persons (Nieuwenhuys and Pécoud, 
2007). As a result, some have argued that the predominant security paradigms have grad-
ually shifted from war-fighting to crime-fighting (Andreas and Price, 2001). Some schol-
ars even contend that this shift marks a qualitative change in the conduct of foreign and 
security policy (Kaldor et al., 2007).
Developing countries also embraced the transnational crime frame, and initiated early 
discussions to address it. Well before the TIP Protocol was finalized, representatives 
from Guinea claimed that the ‘trafficking of women had been integrated into all forms of 
organized crime,’ and called for ‘strict enforcement measures,’26 while Ghana called for 
law-enforcement cooperation through regional organizations and Interpol.27 More 
recently, leaders of the Dominican Republic have lumped human trafficking together 
with gun trafficking as an international cooperative law-enforcement priority.28 Many 
developing countries desperately need resources to bolster their authority, but also to 
stem the social harms resulting from organized crime. National security concerns have 
thus created additional incentives for devoting resources to combat trafficking for a 
broad range of states. Trafficking in persons has been easy to interpret through the crime 
Figure 1. Framing of trafficking in persons in the global media.
Note: The graph plots the total number of articles in the LexisNexis database referencing ‘trafficking in 
persons’ or a cognate phrase that contain the stem ‘crim-’ against those that mention ‘human right/s.’
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and security frames of the post-Cold War world, in a way consistent with much of the 
literature on ‘securitization’ (Balzacq, 2005; Buzan et al., 1998; McDonald, 2008; 
Stritzel, 2007; Wæver, 1995).
What produces consensus? Expectations about the power of specific 
frames
By the 1990s, the international community had not spoken authoritatively on trafficking in 
persons in 45 years, when it had cast the problem largely in terms of prostitution. The Cold 
War was over, international human rights had a firm legal footing and advocacy network 
worldwide, and transnational crime was increasingly understood as a serious challenge to 
state authority and even security. States varied significantly in their exposure to trafficking 
in persons, their commitment to human rights, their cultural orientation toward such things 
as sex work and child labor, and certainly in their economic and legal capacity to enforce 
border controls and prosecute crime. Given this heterogeneity, how has it been possible to 
form and maintain some degree of consensus on trafficking in persons?
We argue that state consensus regarding this complex issue was largely driven by 
framing the problem in terms of crime-fighting. Criminalization asserts the authority of 
the state versus transnational challenges; it justifies resourcing the police power of the 
state, beefing up border controls, and even seeking international aid to do so (as many 
developing countries emphasize). Human rights guarantees, on the other hand, create 
obligations toward individuals — often, foreign individuals. Many states perceive that 
they are saturated with rights obligations and eschew any additional explicit rights obli-
gations, especially toward non-citizens. This is not to deny that a good many states take 
human rights seriously; rather, we argue that the inherently state-empowering crime-
fighting approach is much more likely to appeal to a broader coalition of states than are 
human rights obligations toward foreigners.
We do not claim that human rights justifications for strong anti-trafficking norms 
were irrelevant to consensus formation; far from it. By the 1990s, NGOs, some progres-
sive states, and the OHCHR were strong advocates for the rights of trafficked victims, 
while many states balked at efforts to impose yet another set of legal, institutional, and 
financial obligations. In order to get a consensus, the crime-fighting frame was crucial. 
It has brought more states on board, and made possible an integrative approach that 
accommodates both rights and crime-fighting. The evidence suggests that concerns 
about victims (rights and protection) were accommodated into the integrative ‘3P’ 
approach primarily because of the growing commitment to crime-fighting. The crime 
frame literally helped grow the coalition of states against trafficking in persons. We dem-
onstrate this in the following through an analysis of the adopted UNGA resolutions lead-
ing to, and following the adoption of, the TIP Protocol.
Consensus formation: Evidence from the UN
Data and expectations
Since frames are often presented in communicating texts (Entman, 1993: 52) and ‘issues 
are securitized through discursive “speech acts”’ (Jackson, 2006: 301), our empirical 
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investigation focuses on resolutions of the UN — the major global forum in which states 
have the opportunity to express a broad range of attitudes. ‘Consensus’ is a collection of 
attitudes and is therefore difficult to observe directly, but expressed support in a formal 
public forum such as the UN is a useful proxy for attitude formation and convergence. 
These resolutions are especially useful because consensus formation is a process that 
unfolds over time, as states struggle to define the nature of the problem they are facing 
and the alternatives for confronting it. State support for various communicative texts in 
this series represents an observable and roughly comparable indicator of attitudes over 
time expressed in a controlled setting. Unlike studies of treaty ratification (Lloyd et al., 
2012), these agreements reflect the process that produced the adopted treaty in the first 
place.
Our database is comprised of the universe of resolutions adopted in the UN Third 
Committee from 1994 to 2012 on ‘trafficking in women and girls.’29 These resolutions 
do not relate exclusively to females, despite this label; beginning in 1995, they also rec-
ognize the victimization of males. We focus on these resolutions to keep the data-generating 
process constant, as these 12 documents represent the longest sequence of trafficking 
resolutions in the Third Committee.
Unfortunately, these resolutions were adopted without recorded votes. The best indi-
cator we have of consensus formation is the change in the content of resolutions over 
time and the record of which countries introduced and formally endorsed each resolution 
for consideration by the Third Committee. Endorsement is quite meaningful: it requires 
bureaucratic attention to an issue and therefore is not a costless gesture. States that sup-
port the introduction of a resolution go on record as supportive of its general purposes 
and its specific priorities. Unfortunately, there is no record of resolutions that failed or 
that were deterred from being introduced. Nonetheless, we are able to analyze the lan-
guage associated with resolution support and observe endorsement patterns over time.
To preview our findings, crime language is associated with more sponsors, more 
diverse supporters, and stronger language in general than is the human rights frame. 
Crime language is also more likely than human rights language to elicit state endorse-
ment. These results are remarkably robust across a diverse range of states, although we 
do find some evidence that destination and transit states, in particular, are attracted to a 
strong law-enforcement approach. Taken together, the evidence of state support suggests 
that consensus on how to respond to trafficking in persons was facilitated by framing the 
issue as challenging the authority and security of states and their societies. Human rights 
could be accommodated into the integrative ‘3P’ approach because of the growing 
emphasis on crime-fighting.
Evidence of consensus formation
We begin by reviewing the evidence that international consensus regarding trafficking 
in persons has been building over time. After a 45-year hiatus, beginning in 1994, a 
resolution on trafficking in persons has been adopted roughly every one to two years. 
Also adopted after the TIP Protocol entered into force in 2003 are resolutions focused 
on improving the coordination of efforts against trafficking. This is a basic indicator 
that states agree, at a minimum, that the problem of trafficking in persons belongs near 
the top of the international agenda. Moreover, the number of states sponsoring 
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resolutions has increased since 2000 and remains at a high level, hovering around 100 
co-sponsors since 2006. That is, by the 2000s, a majority of UN members have been 
willing to sponsor resolutions that address the issue of trafficking in persons, as Figure 2 
demonstrates.
The diversity of states that support anti-trafficking resolutions has also increased over 
time. Figure 3 plots the number of resolution sponsors and endorsers by World Bank 
income category. Anti-trafficking resolutions have clearly not been the pet project of the 
wealthier destination states. These trends indicate that the consensus against trafficking 
has generally been high and has retained its diversity as the movement has gathered 
steam.
Another critical indicator of consensus is the content of the resolutions themselves. 
When international consensus is low, we should expect a series of resolutions represent-
ing quite disparate views, reflecting the variety of ideas and concerns. Low consensus 
should also reflect frequent language shifts from one resolution to another. As consensus 
begins to form, we should expect resolutions to converge on similar language, reflective 
of the shared ideas, interpretation of the problem, and the best solution to the problem.
To test this idea, we analyzed changes in the language of resolutions over time,30 
comparing the use of word stems from one resolution to the next (disregarding word 
order), and plot the differences chronologically in Figure 4. Resolution language changes 
less and less over time, as relatively minor adjustments are necessary to glean support. 
This is especially true after the passage of the 2000 TIP Protocol. Language similarity 
has increased even as resolutions are getting longer and more detailed, which suggests 
convergence on their increasingly precise content over the past two decades.31
Figure 2. Sponsorship of resolutions on women trafficking over time.
Note: The graph plots the total number of unique countries co-sponsoring a women-trafficking resolution in 
a given year. UNCTOC = UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
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But what, exactly, are these resolutions converging on? One indicator of growing 
consensus might be the strength of language that calls on states to take particular actions. 
As a first cut, we examined the resolutions for ‘pressure language’ — clauses that are a 
Figure 3. Sponsors of women-trafficking resolutions by income groups.
Note: UNCTOC = UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
Source: World Bank data.
Figure 4. Cosine similarity of women-trafficking resolutions.
Note: Cosine similarity of word stems between each two consecutive women-trafficking resolutions over 
time. UNCTOC = UN Convention against Transnational Organized Crime.
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call to action. Figure 5 graphs the frequency of two phrases used to identify such clauses 
over time: ‘urges’ and ‘calls upon.’ There is a nearly linear increase in the frequency of 
these words over time in these resolutions.
Interestingly, stronger language has apparently not resulted in less support. Quite the 
contrary: there is an unmistakable positive correlation between the strength of language 
and the number of states supporting a resolution over time (see Figure 6). This is consist-
ent with our claim that there has been a significant increase in the international consensus 
about how to confront trafficking in persons among states over the last two decades.
To summarize, the history of resolutions passed by the UNGA Third Committee dem-
onstrates that the international consensus to oppose trafficking in persons has grown over 
time in terms of the number of resolutions and the number and diversity of sponsors of 
such resolutions. Moreover, there is evidence of both increasingly minor language 
adjustments and the growing use of language that expresses urgency to take action, espe-
cially after the landmark 2000 agreement. Moreover, the more urgent the resolution, the 
more support it tended to attract. All of these constitute evidence of a developing consen-
sus among states on the need to address the problem and the way to do so. We now return 
to our primary question: how has consensus been possible among heterogeneous state 
actors in such a relatively short period of time?
Explaining consensus formation
Documenting frames
Our central argument is that international consensus is swayed by the way an issue is 
framed; in particular, frames that securitize an issue are more likely to attract state 
Figure 5. Pressure language in women-trafficking resolutions.
Note: Strength of clauses expressing urgency in women-trafficking resolutions over time. Pressure language 
is defined as a use of clauses starting with ‘urges’ and ‘calls upon.’ UNCTOC = UN Convention against 
Transnational Organized Crime.
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support than those that do not. To make this point, we analyze how the content of these 
resolutions has evolved from 1994 to 2012. If our central claim is correct, states should 
support resolutions that frame trafficking as an issue of combating transnational crime 
more readily than resolutions adopting alternative interpretations.
To assess the framing content, we hand-coded the resolutions using traditional tech-
niques of content analysis. While this is time-intensive, human judgment and expert 
knowledge improve validity, and allow us to derive more insights from the complex and 
highly stylized language employed in the UNGA resolutions. In our coding of trafficking 
resolutions, we follow a standard approach by focusing on individual clauses (or 
‘phrases’).32 Clauses represent complete ideas and are easy to identify in trafficking reso-
lutions, which follow a rigid format.
In particular, all resolutions include: a heading (specifying the body issuing the reso-
lution); preambular clauses (indicating the framework through which the problem is 
viewed); and operative clauses (outlining recommendations for the course of action). All 
clauses generally start with verbs or adverbs (such as ‘concerned,’ ‘convinced,’ ‘wel-
coming,’ ‘reaffirming,’ ‘encouraging,’ ‘recognizing,’ ‘urges,’ ‘welcomes,’ ‘calls upon,’ 
‘encourages,’ ‘invites’) and convey one idea or call for a specific action. We coded each 
separate clause as adopting a human rights frame33 or a crime frame,34 or conveying 
other information.35
It is important to realize that states apparently do care about the language of these UN 
resolutions, especially when their own citizens are victimized. For instance, when in 1995, 
resolution RES 50/167 was discussed in the Third Committee, states disagreed over includ-
ing the phrase ‘internationally recognized human rights standards.’36 Spain, a country of 
transit and destination for trafficking, strongly objected to the phrase, while representatives 
Figure 6. Pressure language and the number of sponsors of women-trafficking resolutions.
Note: Relationship between clauses expressing urgency and the number of sponsors in women-trafficking 
resolutions.
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of the Philippines and India, both countries of origin, preferred its inclusion, but accepted 
the proposed change. States press hard for specific expressions, and sometimes refuse to 
support resolutions that contain language with which they disagree. An examination of the 
Trauvaux Preparatoires of the TIP Protocol shows that the obligation to criminalize 
(Article V) elicited much less debate than sections on rehabilitation of victims.37
Figure 7 illustrates how the salience of human rights and crime frames in Third 
Committee resolutions on trafficking in persons has changed over time. While the reso-
lutions started with predominantly rights framing, over time, the proportions of human 
rights and crime clauses per resolution nearly converge. Prior to the 2000 TIP Protocol, 
more than 40% of the content was focused on the rights aspect, and only 10% on the 
crime aspect. By 2005, two years after the Protocol entered into force, rights clauses 
dropped to about 25% of the content while the total number of crime clauses nearly dou-
bled, representing a clear shift in emphasis. Sponsorship, urgency, and language uni-
formity also increased with the growing dominance of the crime frame.
Framing and consensus: Resolution as the unit of analysis
So far, we have shown that the number of crime clauses in these resolutions has increased 
over time. But is the crime frame more powerful than the human rights frame in spurring 
consensus on a programmatic response at the UN? If so, then the more crime-oriented 
the resolution, the broader the support and the stronger we might expect the language of 
each resolution to be.
Table 1 reveals that more crime words are correlated with more total support: every 
additional crime clause attracts nearly 13 more sponsors. In addition, the emphasis on 
Figure 7. Rights and crime framing in women-trafficking resolutions.
Note: The proportion of rights and crime clauses to the total number of clauses in women-trafficking resolu-
tions.
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crime is positively correlated with stronger and more urgent language in the resolutions 
overall. There is also some evidence — though our coefficient does not quite reach sta-
tistical significance — that crime language is positively correlated with the diversity of 
resolution support, as measured by the Herfindahl Index calculated across World Bank 
income categories (see Table 1). This effect is mild largely because, as Figure 3 demon-
strated, support for these resolutions was fairly diverse in the first place.
Table 1 reveals very different results for human rights clauses. These clauses do not 
result in additional supporters (the coefficient suggests that each additional clause may 
actually reduce support by one state, but it is not statistically significant), and they are 
not correlated with additional pressure clauses. There is also a good possibility that rights 
clauses slightly reduce the diversity of supporters. Although our sample is small (12 
resolutions), Table 1 does provide some evidence that crime rather than rights clauses 
drive the growing support for the resolutions on trafficking in women and girls.
Framing and resolution support: State decisions to sponsor as the unit of 
analysis
Do states prefer to support resolutions with a greater human rights emphasis or those with 
a stronger crime-fighting emphasis? In this section, we analyze each country’s decision to 
sponsor a trafficking in women resolution, examining support patterns for 150 countries 
and 12 resolutions for a total of 1800 country-year observations. We begin by estimating 
a logistic model with a fixed-effects estimator to explore how framing affects the likeli-
hood of sponsorship. In this model, country indicators control for country-specific effects 
(i.e. the omitted country-level variables that are constant over time). We also estimate a 
fixed-effects logistic model with an interaction term between human rights and crime 
clauses to explore whether there is a trade-off between choosing one emphasis over the 
other. As Figure 7 shows, the number of crime and human rights clauses has converged 
over time, which suggests that accommodating both concerns may facilitate consensus.
Second, we examine the hypothesis that the changes in resolution framing have con-
tributed to the changes in sponsorship. Here, we employ the conditional logit model, and 
Table 1. Framing and the number of sponsors of women-trafficking resolutions.
No. sponsors No. of pressure 
clauses






12.754 (3.509)** 1.535 (.467)** 3.561 (1.788)+ .008 (.005)
No. rights 
clauses
−1.079 (4.677) .256 (0.623) 2.598 (2.348) −.012 (.006)+
Constant 5.253 (36.027) −4.185 (4.802) −9.144 (18.360) .832 (.050)***
Adjusted 
R-squared
.836 .853 .795 .102
F-statistic 29.05*** 32.98*** 22.29*** 1.623
Notes: Regression coefficients (robust standard errors). +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001. N = 12.
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rely only on information from those countries that change their sponsorship behavior 
(e.g. they sponsor a resolution after having abstained from sponsorship of a similar reso-
lution in the previous year). Since the conditional logit model is a difference estimator, 
statistical results will measure the degree to which changes in the language of the resolu-
tions influence changes in sponsorship behavior.38
In all regressions, our dependent variable is binary: coded 1 if a country sponsors 
(endorses) a resolution and 0 if it does not. Our main explanatory variables are the 
human-coded number of crime and human rights clauses, which proxy for the emphasis 
on crime-fighting or human rights. We control for the prevalence of pressure language 
and for the total number of clauses per resolution, and explore the role of income and 
salience of trafficking in the decision to sponsor a resolution.39
Table 2 summarizes results for the logistic regression of resolution sponsorship 
from three models.40 The coefficient on the number of crime clauses is positive and 
significant — statistically as well as substantively — across all models, even when 
controlling for the total number of clauses per resolution. The coefficient on the num-
ber of rights clauses is much smaller and not significant in Models 1 and 3. This large 
positive coefficient on the number of crime clauses is consistent with our hypothesis 
that adopting the crime frame has increased state support for combating trafficking in 
persons.41 Including an interaction term in Model 2 substantially increases the coeffi-
cients on both crime and rights clauses, and the coefficient on the number of rights 
clauses becomes significant. The coefficient on the interaction term is negative and 
statistically significant, albeit small. The interaction term suggests an interesting trade-
off between the relative strength of crime and rights framing: the effect of the number 
of crime clauses on the probability of sponsoring a trafficking resolution decreases as 
Table 2. The decision to sponsor a resolution on the trafficking of women and girls.
DV: 1(0) = sponsor(not) Model 1 (fixed 
effects)




No. crime clauses .573 (.114)*** 1.347 (.287)*** .473 (.107)***
No. rights clauses .113 (.074) .528 (.164)** .103 (.113)
Crime clauses*rights clauses − −.082 (.028)** −
No. pressure clauses .227 (.091)* .307 (.101)** .217 (.081)**
No. total clauses −.086 (.023)*** −.090 (.023)*** −.081 (.021)***
Crime clauses*high income .315 (.176)
Rights clauses*high income .080 (.211)
Crime clauses*low income −.104 (.142)
Rights clauses*low income −.053 (.181)
Constant −4.728 (.594)*** −8.761 (1.561)*** −
Wald chi2 − − 396.380
P > X2 − − .000
Observations 1800 1800 1800
Countries (groups) 150 150 150
Notes: Logistic regression results (robust standard errors). Country dummies omitted to save space. *p < 
.05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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the number of rights clauses grows, and vice versa. Figure 8 presents the interaction 
effect graphically.
The influence of the crime frame is strong across state income levels (see Table 3). 
The coefficient on the number of crime clauses is positive and significant in all three 
subsets of countries (and is largest for middle-income countries). This suggests that 
crime language is likely to elicit an endorsement across a very diverse range of countries. 
By comparison, the coefficient on the number of human rights clauses changes sign 
across regressions and is not statistically significant.
We also test for the nature of a country’s exposure to trafficking, hypothesizing that 
destination and transit states are most affected by the negative externalities of trafficking 
and, therefore, should be more likely to sponsor resolutions that adopt the crime frame. 
In contrast, countries of origin may be more interested in protecting the rights of their 
citizens victimized by trafficking and, thus, more likely to sponsor resolutions that focus 
on rights. We use the UN Report on Trafficking in Persons: Global Patterns42 to docu-
ment the incidence of reporting of origin, destination, and transit countries at three levels 
of intensity — very low, low, medium, high, and very high (coded 1 through 5). We sepa-
rate countries into two groups: primarily countries of origin with a low incidence of 
transit, and primarily destination and transit countries.43 Results in Table 4 support our 
hypothesis that countries of destination and transit are more concerned with a focus on 
crime, as evidenced by the much larger coefficient on the number of crime clauses. In 
comparison, rights clauses and pressure clauses are large and significant only for the 
states of origin.
Finally, we examine the substantive impact of the independent variables on the likeli-
hood of sponsorship from our primary regression analysis using the estimates of the 
fixed-effects logit model in Figure 9. The results show that the probability of sponsorship 
Figure 8. Probability of sponsorship: Interaction between the number of rights and crime 
clauses.
Note: The effect of the number of crime clauses on the probability of sponsorship of a women-trafficking 
resolution at different levels of rights clauses.
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increases much faster with the number of crime clauses than with the number of rights 
clauses. In an average resolution, with six crime clauses and 11 rights clauses, the prob-
ability of sponsorship is 0.13. When the number of crime clauses increases by one, the 
probability of sponsorship changes to 0.21 (i.e. by 0.08). In contrast, when the number of 
rights clauses increases by one, the probability changes to 0.14 (i.e. by 0.01).
To summarize, statistical analysis shows that the probability of sponsorship increases 
in the number of clauses that reflect the crime framing, but not in the number of clauses 
that reflect the rights framing. The effect of crime language is substantively large and 
statistically significant and holds for countries in different income groups and at different 
levels of exposure to trafficking.
Discussion and conclusions
Consensus among states is often critical to effectively handle the world’s most pressing 
collective problems, from global warming, to the spread of HIV, to nuclear security. 
Trafficking in persons is one such problem. States have been grappling with this issue for 
more than a century, but until recently, broad consensus on the nature of, and solutions 
to, the problem has been elusive. In the first half of the past century, geographically 
Table 3. The effect of frames on the likelihood of resolution sponsorship, by income level.
DV: 1(0) = sponsor(not) High income Middle income Low income
No. crime clauses .517 (.257)* .591 (.168)** .510 (.213)*
No. rights clauses −.101 (.150) .156 (.105) .169 (.148)
No. pressure clauses .220 (.223) −.221 (.141) .270 (.143)
No. total clauses .034 (.057) −.101 (.033)** −.132 (.046)**
Observations 420 888 492
Countries (groups) 35 74 41
Notes: Logistic regression with country fixed effects (robust standard errors). Country dummies omitted to 
save space. +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
Table 4. The effect of frames on the likelihood of resolution sponsorship, by trafficking ‘type.’
DV: 1(0) = sponsor(not) States of origin Transit and destination states
No. crime clauses .463 (.172)** .694 (.178)***
No. rights clauses .315 (.168)+ .012 (.163)
No. pressure clauses .431 (.153)** .060 (.159)
No. total clauses −.172 (.040)*** −.029 (.042)
Constant −3.200 (1.338)* −3.036 (1.231)*
Observations 480 504
Countries (groups) 40 42
Notes: Logistic regression with country fixed effects (robust standard errors). Country dummies omitted to 
save space. +p < .10; *p < .05; **p < .01; ***p < .001.
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limited international agreements fixated on prostitution were the dominant approach. 
Trafficking in persons became even more challenging in the second half of the century: 
Figure 9a. Probability of sponsorship and crime framing: Model 1 (fixed-effects logit).
Figure 9b. Probability of sponsorship and rights framing: Model 1 (fixed-effects logit).
Note: The graphs represent how the number of crime and rights clauses affects the probability of sponsor-
ship, with all other variables held at their means (using Model 1, fixed-effects logit).
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how could nearly 200 highly heterogeneous independent states reach agreement on how 
best to deal with a complex problem stemming from globalization, lagging local oppor-
tunities, and economic disruption in many parts of the world? How would this be possi-
ble among states that were variably sources, transit routes, and destinations for trafficking 
in persons — each with their own set of social and political challenges? And how would 
this be possible with very different cultural, legal, and institutional values and 
capacities?
The framing of the issue was critical for reaching a broad consensus, as it often is 
in policymaking settings. We have emphasized the distinction between the human 
rights and crime frames to show how the latter garnered broad support among the com-
munity of states. This crime frame had deep historical roots — as seen in the numerous 
references to ‘punishment’ in early agreements — but the forces of globalization in the 
early post-Cold War years made transnational crime seem more widespread, threaten-
ing, and urgent than in earlier periods. Governments were increasingly concerned with 
protecting their borders and their very sovereignty from organized crime that poten-
tially threatened local economies, societies, and the integrity of national governance. 
This framing made human trafficking easy to ‘securitize’ and could be used to justify 
stronger law-enforcement and border regimes, and perhaps even increase foreign aid 
for these purposes.
Human rights — respect for the individual as a human being, including their safety, 
autonomy, and dignity — offered another compelling way to view the problem of traf-
ficking in persons. A ‘rights revolution’ had rather thoroughly altered the international 
normative atmosphere between the 1960s and the 1990s, and it was no longer possible 
politically or morally to approach trafficking in persons as a simple matter of interna-
tional cooperation to enforce national vice laws. Global NGOs (from Amnesty 
International, to Stop the Traffic) and local NGOs (from the Philippines, to Mongolia, to 
Costa Rica) added their voices to those of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against 
Women and other officials to demand attention to the plight of the trafficked. They had 
plenty of legal and normative ammunition in the form of widely accepted international 
agreements, such as the Convention on the Elimination of Discrimination Against 
Women, the Convention on the Rights of the Child (especially the optional protocol on 
child exploitation), and, more recently, the International Convention on the Protection of 
the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Members of Their Families. Bolstered by three 
decades of international human rights agreements, these actors made a compelling case 
that, first and foremost, trafficking in persons is a problem of rights, and should be 
declared and dealt with as such.
As important as human rights are to the global normative environment, the evidence 
analyzed here suggests that consensus on trafficking in persons has been facilitated by 
foregrounding the crime frame. Our focus on Third Committee resolutions provides a 
window into the consensus-building process in the UN, the forum in which every state 
has a right to participate. The years 1994–2012 are especially revealing because they 
represent a ‘new look’ at an issue that had been largely ignored by the international com-
munity since the late 1940s. These resolutions reveal the building blocks of consensus 
formation in an especially useful way: by allowing us to literally compare the language 
that attracts state support from that which does not.
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The patterns in the texts reveal a fairly clear trend. Crime framing is associated with 
more endorsers, more diverse supporters, and stronger language in general than is the 
human rights frame. Crime language is also more likely than human rights language to 
elicit state endorsement for a particular resolution. Destination and transit states — those 
who are impacted by the presence of organized crime networks but whose citizens are 
less likely to be at risk — are especially attracted to a strong law-enforcement approach.
Our findings do not imply that human rights are insignificant to the human trafficking 
regime. On the contrary, our research shows that concern for human rights was strong in 
the early resolutions of the 1990s. However, to broaden the coalition against trafficking 
in persons, stronger and more consistent attention had to be paid to states’ security con-
cerns, which meant framing the issue in terms of its linkages to all of the dangers associ-
ated with transnational crime. Consensus could be reached because rights advocates and 
actors concerned about national security accommodated one another’s concerns. Initially 
based on a fragile consensus, the ‘3P’ framework that emerged in 2000 strengthened over 
time and eventually embraced victim protection, prosecution, and prevention. The TIP 
Protocol itself requires states to develop domestic laws criminalizing trafficking in per-
sons, but it also gives them the flexibility to prioritize protection of victim rights, as the 
Legislative Guide on the treaty makes clear.44
This research has important implications for how states reach consensus on conten-
tious issues in international politics. While much recent research has concentrated on 
how and why states ratify international agreements, it is important to understand how 
such agreements become possible in the first place. Traditional histories are useful in this 
regard, but it is also instructive to take seriously the public record of state support for 
various interpretations of a problem and how this shapes eventual solutions.
We have argued that frames can be chosen selectively in order to increase the proba-
bility of getting a broad agreement on an issue. Our account emphasizes strategic fram-
ing, but also accommodation of alternative values and viewpoints. While other scholars 
have emphasized socialization (Goodman and Jinks, 2004; Johnston, 2002) or persua-
sion (Deitelhoff, 2009; Hawkins, 2004; Risse, 2000) as a critical feature of world poli-
tics, we stress coalition building and the process of accommodation. Rather than 
hammering away at the human rights travesty that trafficking in persons certainly repre-
sents, states were drawn to support crime-fighting and the broader threat that illicit trans-
border flows represent. The 3P approach appealed primarily to those worried about 
security, while continuing to acknowledge important human rights issues. Advancing a 
framework of criminalization and law enforcement encouraged a broad consensus 
through what might be thought of as a soft ‘log-roll’ of rights concerns and crime-fighting 
— a combination of aims that many observers have noted are not always fully 
compatible.
Much work remains to be done to explain why one frame trumps the other and why 
the dominance of a given frame changes over time across issue areas and historical time 
periods. A vast array of documents await exploration to add nuance to our understanding 
of framing and consensus formation — draft resolutions, verbatim records, country state-
ments, and media framing of the issues. And while trafficking in persons is a useful start-
ing point for studying framing and consensus formation, the opportunities are vast in 
other areas of international cooperation. This research captures an important part of 
 at Harvard Libraries on June 24, 2015ejt.sagepub.comDownloaded from 
346 European Journal of International Relations 21(2) 
international consensus formation that is foundational to international coordination and 
cooperation — especially on transnational issues such as crime, of which trafficking in 
persons is a particularly egregious example.
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18. The 1949 agreement, for example, focused solely on prostitution and included only a meek 
reference to human rights in the Preamble.
19. TIP Protocol, Part II, Articles 6–8.
20. See Radhika Coomaraswamy, Report of the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, 
its causes and consequences. E/CN.4/1997/47, 12 February 1997. Available at: http://www.
unhchr.ch/Huridocda/Huridoca.nsf/0/043c76f98a706362802566b1005e9219?Opendocum
ent (accessed 16 January 2014).
21. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women (see note 20).
22. See Amnesty International’s webpage on trafficking. Available at: http://www.amnestyusa.
org/violence-against-women/end-human-trafficking/page.do?id=1108428 (accessed 15 June 
2010).
23. Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women (see note 20).
24. White Slave Traffic (see note 6), Preamble.
25. Mr McDonough’s statement is available at: http://thecnnfreedomproject.blogs.cnn.
com/2012/03/15/human-trafficking-a-national-security-issue-obama-task-force-told/ 
(accessed 20 January 2014).
26. Maria Manuela Lopes da Rosa (Guinea-Bissau); GA/SHC/3368 16th Meeting (PM), 28 
October 1996. Available at: http://www.un.org/News/Press/docs/1996/19961028.gash3368.
html (accessed 15 December 2013)
27. Third Committee, Press Release GA/SHC/3476 15th Meeting (AM), 16 October 1998. 
Available at: https://www.fas.org/irp/news/1998/10/19981016_gash3476.html (accessed 20 
January 2014).
28. See note 27.
29. Other relevant UNGA documents include four Third Committee resolutions focused on coor-
dination of efforts against trafficking in persons (2006, 2008, 2009, 2012), and five trafficking 
resolutions passed in the Human Rights Committee (2008, 2009, 2010, 2011, 2012). These 
resolutions were included in our initial analysis and the results are provided in our online 
appendix.
30. We created a term document matrix with columns representing frequencies of each word 
stem in each document. We then computed cosine similarity coefficients between documents 
based on the correlation between their stem vectors. Because the standard preambular and 
operative phrases that all resolutions share improve similarity too much, we multiplied the 
raw stem counts by Inverse Document Frequency (idf). The cosine similarity is bounded 
between [0,1].
31. The growing length of the resolutions also reflects the incorporation of ‘vetted’ language by 
referencing prior adopted resolutions and treaties.
32. The best-known political science projects that categorize texts by hand include the Comparative 
Manifesto Project (Budge, 2001; Klingemann et al., 1994) and the Policy Agendas Project 
(Baumgartner et al., 2007). These projects specify the unit of textual analysis as the quasi-
sentence, defined as ‘an argument which is the verbal expression of one political idea or issue’ 
(Däubler et al., 2012).
33. A few examples of human rights clauses: ‘trafficking in persons is a serious threat to human 
dignity, human rights and development’; ‘concern for the security of the victims and respect 
for the full enjoyment of their human rights’; ‘comprehensive anti-trafficking strategy that 
integrates a human rights perspective’; ‘stressing once again the need for Governments 
to provide standard humanitarian treatment to trafficked persons consistent with human 
rights standards.’ Clauses that referenced the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC), 
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Convention on the Elimination of ALL forms of Discrimination against Women (CEDAW), 
and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights were also coded as adopting the human rights 
frame.
34. A few examples of crime clauses: ‘increasing activities of transnational criminal organiza-
tions and others that profit from international trafficking in persons’; ‘the combating of cor-
ruption and laundering of proceeds derived from trafficking’; ‘to bring to justice and punish 
the offenders and intermediaries involved, including public officials involved with trafficking 
in persons’; ‘increasing syndication of the sex trade and the internationalization of the traffic 
in women and girl children.’ We also coded the clauses that referenced the UNCTOC or the 
International Criminal Court as adopting the crime frame.
35. Victim protection is referenced in both the human rights and crime-focused resolutions, so 
our focus is on these two frames.
36. See summary record A/C.3/50/SR.50 and resolution draft A/C.3/50/L.26.
37. Travaux Preparatoires of the negotiations of UNCTOC and the TIP Protocol. Available at: 
http://www.unodc.org/unodc/en/treaties/CTOC/travaux-preparatoires.html (accessed 20 
January 2014).
38. The main advantage of conditional logit models is their flexibility. It is possible to include 
interactions of resolution-level and country-level variables, which would have to be omitted 
in a simpler fixed-effects model. For the use of this model to estimate the effect of contribu-
tions on roll-call voting behavior, see Stratmann (2002) and Rubenzer (2011).
39. See the online appendix for alternative measures of rights and crime framing based on word 
stems.
40. In our regression, we combined lower- and upper- middle-income countries into one group, 
‘middle income.’
41. See the online appendix for the table of marginal effects.
42. UNODC, Trafficking In Persons: Global Patterns (April 2006). Available at: http://www.
unodc.org/documents/human-trafficking/HT-globalpatterns-en.pdf (accessed 16 May 2014).
43. The first group includes countries that are coded medium, high, or very high for reporting 
origin and also coded 0 or 1 for reporting transit. The second group includes countries that are 
coded low, medium, high, or very high for reporting transit and medium, high, or very high 
for reporting destination. Some countries were excluded from the analysis as they could not 
fit into either of the categories due to being both origin and destination or origin and transit 
states.
44. UNODC (2009) Legislative guide for the Trafficking in Persons Protocol.
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